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WILLS-DEVISE TO EXECUTOR FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION-
APPLICATION OF TRUST AND POWER DOCTRINES-Bequests to ex-
ecutors for distribution to persons to be selected by the executor 
may be and have been treated in many different ways. Tradition-
ally, such bequests are categorized by the courts in terms of 
trust, power, or gift law. Inasmuch as each of these bodies of 
doctrinal law has grown independently with little attempt by 
the judiciary to interrelate their operative characteristics, clas-
sification frequently spells substantial difference in terms of 
the validity, construction, and effect of the devise. 
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A comparison of the results reached in two basic cases il-
lustrates the problem. In the first case, testator devised "the 
residue of my estate to be disposed of in accordance with the 
judgment and advice of my executor." This bequest, considered 
as creating a discretionary power, was held valid and the executor 
was permitted to designate the persons who would take bene-
ficially .1 In the other, the testator devised "the residue of my 
estate to my executor in trust, granting the executor absolute 
authority to dispose of the residue." This devise was held totally 
void under trust law which does not permit, as will be indicated 
below, such an indefinite class of takers.2 Thus, although in 
terms. of apparent testamentary intent the charge upon the ex-
ecutor was substantially identical in both cases, the law as it 
has developed dictates conflicting results. Because of a failure 
by the courts to correlate the laws of trust and power, this 
striking inconsistency is perpetuated. This comment is designed 
to demonstrate the potential. anomalies which exist in traditional 
thinking in this area and to point up some possibilities for cor-
relation of the hitherto unrelated concepts developed in the 
trust and power realms. 
I. Traditional Law and Analysis 
In each decision on the legal effect of a testamentary clause 
granting some distributive choice to the executor there are two 
steps in process of analysis. The court will first classify the clause 
as creating or attempting to create a trust, power, or gift. Hav-
ing chosen the body of applicable law, the court will then pro-
ceed to give effect to the terms thereof solely in terms of the 
single body selected. Because of the immense differences in re-
sult imposed by doctrines in each of the three legal areas, the 
court's initial step is a fortiori as important as the second. Both 
therefore merit attention. 
A. Rules of Construction. The decisions provide few clear-
cut guides for predicting whether a given devise will be con-
strued as invoking power, trust, or gift rules. The fact that a 
transferee is an executor has led some courts to presume that 
l An example of such a holding, based on language essentially like the first devise, 
is Watts's Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51 A. 588 (1902). 
2 An example of such a holding, based on language essentially like the second devise, 
is Estate of Ralston, l Cal. (2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934). 
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the transfer was in trust,3 but other courts have reached gift or 
power constructions in an identical situation.4 Similarly, use of 
the terms "trustee" or "in trust" has been made the basis for 
finding a trust intention.5 These terms, on the other hand, may 
be held merely to evidence some trust intent, leaving the way 
open for a finding that power or gift law should be applied if 
the court finds the construction more consistent with the ap-
parent testamentary intent.6 "Trustee" may even be held to 
have been employed solely to describe the person who is to receive 
a beneficial gift.7 
When the devise is to the executor "to dispose of" or "to 
distribute," this language has been held to indicate a trust intent, 
in order to avoid treating the word "dispose" or "distribute" 
as mere surplusage.8 Precatory words have also been construed 
as indicating an intent not to make a beneficial gift, 9 and such 
language may even provide the basis for imposition of trust 
obligations.10 
It is also apparent that the construction placed upon legal 
terms may vary, depending on whether they have been written 
by a lawyer or a lay testator.11 The layman may use the term 
"trust" as a synonym for "faith" or "confidence," not intending 
3Thomas v. Anderson, (8th Cir. 1917) 245 F. 642; In re Brown's Estate, 122 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 640 (1953); Tunis v. Dole, 97 N.H. 420, 89 A. (2d) 760 (1952). 3 PROPERTY R.EsTATEMENT 
§323, comment e (1940). Cases on this point are collected in 104 A.L.R. 114 (1936) and 
151 AL.R. 1438 (1944). 
4 Watts's Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51 A. 588 (1902); Gilman v. Gilman, 99 Conn. 598, 122 
A. 386 (1923). 
5 Estate of Ralston, I Cal. (2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934). In Townsend v. Gordon, 
308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944), and Harvey, Exr. v. Griggs, 12 Del. Ch. 232, Ill 
A. 437 (1920), the absence of the term "trusts" was used as a basis for a finding that the 
executor took beneficially and not in trust. But Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am. 
R.ep. 445 (1881), in finding that a trust was intended, held that the absence of the term 
"in trust" was immaterial. 
6 In re Renner's Estate, 358 Pa. 409, 57 A. (2d) 836 (1948). See dissenting opinion in 
Estate of Ralston, I Cal. (2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934). 
7Norman v. Prince, 40 R.I. 402, 101 A. 126 (1917); Hodgson v. Dorsey, 230 Iowa 730, 
298 N.W. 895 (1941). 
BThomas v. Anderson, (8th Cir. 1917) 245 F. 642; Davison v. Wyman, Exr., 214 Mass. 
192, 100 N.E. 1105 (1913). 
9 Sears v. Rule, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 374, 114 P. (2d) 57 (1941); Estate of Wadleigh, 250 
Wis. 284, 26 N.W. (2d) 667 (1947). 
10 First-Mechanics Nat. Bank v. First-Mechanics Nat. Bank, 137 N.J. Eq. 106, 43 A. 
(2d) 674 (1945). In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P. (2d) 781 (1952), states that 
precatory words to an executor indicate a trust intent, but that precatory words to a non-
executor do not indicate a trust. In Sears v. Rule, 45 Cal. App, (2d) 374, 114 P. (2d) 57 
(1941), although the court held that precatory words created no trust, it also found that 
the devisee did not take beneficially. See I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §25 (1935). 
11 Will of Dever, 173 Wis. 208, 180 N.W. 839 (1921); Cheney v. Plumb, 79 Wis. 602, 
48 N.W. 668 (1891). 
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to conjure up the normal legal consequences associated with 
the trust. 
These are examples of the conflicting and inconsistent rules 
from which a court may draw in its initial step of construing the 
bequest in terms of the law that it invokes. Lack of clarity and 
positiveness in these rules makes it- difficult to predict what con-
struction will be reached in a given case; there is opportunity 
for wide judicial discretion in choosing the applicable body 
of law. 
B. Substantive Doctrine. Having determined, in the initial 
step of construction, that it is faced with a trust, power, or gift 
case, the court will then apply the principles of that chosen body 
of precedent. 
If the court finds that the bequest provides for a gift to the 
executor, there is of course no real problem as to the validity and 
construction of a discretionary bequest.12 Such a construction 
treats as surplusage all of the devise except "to my executor." 
As the recipient of an absolute gift, the executor is free to trans-
fer it to others in any manner that he desires. 
If, on the other hand, a trust is found to have been intended, 
the trust will be valid only if the testator has met the require-
ments imposed in the famous case of Morice v. The Bishop of 
Durham,13 by designation of a definite trust beneficiary.14 Failure 
in this latter respect totally invalidates the devise, and the ex-
ecutor is said to hold the corpus on a resulting trust for the 
heirs or next of kin of the testator.15 
The extent to which a beneficiary must be defined has never 
been accurately determined. The naming of a single individual 
will of course satisfy the requirement, 16 as will the specification 
of a small class the membership of which can be readily ascer-
tained. Thus "the children of the testator" will suffice.17 If, 
12 Norman v. Prince, 40 R.I. 402, 101 A. 126 (1917); Will of Dever, 173 Wis. 208, 
180 N.W. 839 (1921); Harvey, Exr. v. Griggs, 12 Del. Ch. 232, 111 A. 437 (1920); Cheney 
v. Plumb, 79 Wis. 602, 48 N.W. 668 (1891); Hodgson v. Dorsey, 230 Iowa 730, 298 N.W. 
895 (1941). See note 30 infra. 
13 IO Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805). 
14 Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson, [1944] A.C. 341; Estate of Ralston, 1 Cal. 
(2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934); Uloth v. Little, 321 Mass. 351, 73 N.E. (2d) 459 (1947); 
Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am. Rep. 445 (1881); Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221 
(1881). 
15 Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, IO Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805); Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v. Broadway Cottages Trust, [1954] 3 All E.R. 120; Tunis v. 
Dole, 97 N.H. 420, 89 A. (2d) 760 (1952). See note 14 supra. 
16 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §112 (1935). 
17 Moskowitz v. Federman, 72 Ohio App. 149, 51 N:E. (2d) 48 (1943); Markham v. 
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however, the executor is to select the beneficiaries from a class 
whose membership is neither identifiable nor ascertainable, the 
trust will fail for want of a definite beneficiary under the Morice 
rule.18 A devise which permits the executor to select "anyone" 
as the beneficiary of the trust is therefore too indefinite.19 All 
members of the potential beneficiary class must be ascertain-
able,20 and some courts may even require the class to be readily 
ascertainable. In this latter event, it would seem that an ex-
ecutor's choice among "the cousins of the testator" would fail 
for want of definiteness, even though all the cousins could 
possibly, though with great difficulty, be ascertained.21 
That the executor is permitted to select the actual benefi-
ciaries from a class designated by the testator in no way alters 
the definite beneficiary requirement. To be considered valid, 
such a bequest must specify a class as beneficiary with sufficient 
specificity to meet the Morice rule without consideration, and 
before exercise, of the power of selection.22 
If the executor is to distribute property held in trust for 
named purposes, instead of to a class of persons, the trust will fail 
if the purposes are considered general, indefinite, and non-
charitable.23 Where certain types of specific purposes are desig-
nated, e.g., for the care of horses and dogs,24 the executor will 
be permitted to carry out the trust, despite the fact that there 
is no definite beneficiary to enforce the trust.25 Such an arrange-
Tibbetts, (S.D. N.Y. 1947) 79 F. Supp. 47; Shepard v. Newton, 304 Mass. 6, 22 N.E. (2d) 
618 (1939). 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §120 (1935). 
18 Uloth v. Little, 321 Mass. 351, 73 N.E. (2d) 459 (1947); Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 
281, 133 A. 166 (1926); Murdock v. Bridges, 91 Me. 124, 39 A. 475 (1897); In re Brown's 
Estate, 122 N.Y.S. (2d) 640 (1953); Minot v. Attorney General, 189 Mass. 176, 75 N.E. 149 
(1905). 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §120, comment a, §122, comment a (1935). 
19 Estate of Ralston, 1 Cal. (2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934); Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 
211, 39 Am. Rep. 445 (1881); Blunt v. Taylor, 230 Mass. 303, 119 N.E. 954 (1918); Haskell 
v. Staples, 116 Me. 103, 1/)0 A. 148 (1917); Green v. Allen, 132 Me. 256, 170 A. 504 (1934). 
Cases following this holding are collected at 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §124, note 4 (1956). 
But see note 30 infra, which cites cases involving comparable language, in which the 
devises were held to be gifts. 
20 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §§120, 122 (1935). The Restatement would seem to make 
this the only requirement. Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472, 26 Am. Rep. 680 (1878). 
21 See Dalton v. White, (D.C. Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 55 (1942). 
22 Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926); Minot v. Attorney General, 
189 Mass. 176, 75 N.E. 149 (1905); Shepard v. Newton, 304 Mass. 6, 22 N.E. (2d) 618 (1939). 
1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §120, comment c (1935). 
28 Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805); Chichester 
Diocesan Fund v. Simpson, [1944] A.C. 341; Brown v. Caldwell, 23 W. Va. 187 (1883); 
Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880 (1891). 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §123 (1935). 
24 In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1889). 
25In re Thompson, [1934] Ch. 342; In re Estate of Searight, 87 Ohio App. 417, 95 N.E. 
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ment, termed an honorary trust, has been accepted as an excep-
tion to Morice v. The Bishop of Durham in that want of a 
definite beneficiary does not produce total invalidity. 
The third potential body of law which the court may con-
strue the devise to have invoked is that surrounding a discre✓ 
tionary power of appointment. In power law, there is no basis 
for invalidity analogous to the definite beneficiary rule in the 
trust area.26 Beyond the requirement that the testator must 
furnish a standard whereby appointees can be identified as fall-
ing within the designated class,27 there is no requirement as to 
size or specificity of the class of potential appointees. A general 
power of appointment permits the appointment of anyone. 
Courts have upheld "the friends of the testator"28 and "every-
one in the world except the executor"29 as valid classes of po-
tential appointees. Where the donee's power of disposition is 
absolute and unlimited, however, some courts may find that 
testator intended a gift beneficially and thus remove the bequest 
from the power area.30 On the other hand, if the executor is made 
the donee of a power by which the testator imposes an obligation 
or duty on the executor to exercise the power, the courts will 
construe the bequest as a power coupled with a trust or a power 
in trust and apply traditional trust law with respect to definite-
ness of beneficiary.31 
C. Application and Basis of the Definite Beneficiary Rule. 
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen readily that a court's 
(2d) 779 (1950); St. Stephen's Church v. Morris, 115 Va. 225, 78 S.E. 622 (1913); Estate of 
Koppikus, I Cal. App. 84, 81 P. 732 (1905); Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 56, 46 A. 278 
0900); McCartney v. Jacobs, 288 III. 568, 123 N.E. 557 (1919); I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §124 
(1935). See 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§124 to 124.7 (1956). 
26 Watts's Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51 A. 588 (1902); Dormer Estate, 348 Pa. 356, 
35 A. (2d) 299 (1944); Baldwin v. Davidson, 37 Tenn. App. 606, 267 S.W. (2d) 756 (1954); 
Townsend v. Gordon, 308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944). 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT 
§323 (1940). 
27 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §323, comment h (1940). In re Coates, [1955] Ch. 495. 
28 In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P. (2d) 781 (1952). 
29 In re Park, [1932] I Ch. D. 580. 
80 Norman v. Prince, 40 R.I. 402, IOI A. 126 (1917); Appeal of Richburg, 148 Me. 
323, 92 A. (2d) 724 (1952); Harvey, Exr. v. Griggs, 12 Del. Ch. 232, 111 A. 437 (1920); 
Townsend v. Gordon, 308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944). I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §125 
(1935). Cases following this holding are collected at 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §124, note 
2 (1956). But see note 19 supra, which cites cases involving comparable language, in which 
the devises were held to be invalid trusts. 
81 Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926); First-Mechanics Nat. Bank v. 
First-Mechanics Nat. Bank, 137 N.J. ·Eq., 106, 43 A. (2d) 674 (1945). I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT 
§27 (1935). See In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P. (2d) 781 (1952). Cases on this 
point are collected in 80 A.L.R. 503 (1932). 
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decision to apply trust law rather than gift or power law to the 
bequest may have serious consequences when the executor is 
to name recipients of the testator's bounty from a class of per-
sons. One must be accurate, however, in recognizing the precise 
extent of application of the more restrictive Morice rule. This 
rule dictates a different result from power law in only one of 
the three possible planes of definiteness. Where there is a com-
pletely definite class, i.e., its entire membership is identifiable 
or ascertainable, both a trust and a power to select is valid.32 
Where the class is entirely indefinite, as where the executor is 
to select the takers from a class which is to be specified in a codicil 
which in fact is never executed,33 the devise is always void and 
the heirs or next of kin take. 34 The present discussion centers 
upon the intermediate situation, where some, but not all, of 
the members can be ascertained, as where the property is to be 
distributed to the "friends" of the testator. Undoubtedly, some 
persons could clearly qualify as friends, but it might be quite 
impossible to identify the entire class. Under power law, this 
type of class is an acceptable object of bounty.35 Trust law, how-
ever, dictates that this type of class cannot be validly specified 
a beneficiary. 86 
Although the definite beneficiary rule is so well established 
at present that the courts generally feel no necessity for stating 
any reason for applying it, there have been several reasons urged 
as the rationale for the rule. These suggested bases will merely 
be stated here and later sections of this comment will explore 
their soundness. 
The trust rule has been said to be based on legal necessity, 
in that there cannot be a trust without a beneficiary to enforce 
the trust. Under a Hohfeldian type of analysis, it is urged that 
a valid trust requires a duty in the trustee and that without a 
beneficiary to hold the correlative right it is impossible to im-
82 Hazard v. Bacon, 42 R.I. 415, 108 A. 499 (1920); In re Dewey's Estate, 45 Utah 98, 
143 P. 124 (1914). 3 PROPERTY R.EsrATEMENT §323 (1940); 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §120 
(1935). 
33 Uloth v. Little, 321 Mass. 351, 73 N.E. (2d) 459 (1947); In re Fabbri's Will, I App. 
Div. (2d) 1029, 152 N.Y.S. (2d) 100 (1956); In re Estate of Kessler, 271 Wis. 512, 74 N.W. 
(2d) 146 (1956). 
34 3 PROPERTY R.EsrATEMENT §323, comment h (1940); TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT, SECOND, 
Tentative Draft No. 3, §122, comment e, §123, comment e (1956). See note 33 supra. 
35 In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P. (2d) 781 (1952); In re Coates, [1955] Ch. 
495. 3 PROPERTY R.EsrATEMENT §323, comment h (1940). 
86 Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926); Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 
472, 26 Am. Rep. 680 (1878). 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §122 (1935). ' 
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pose a duty on the trustee.37 It has also been argued that to allow 
a valid trust where there was no definite beneficiary would 
violate public policy by allowing the testator to delegate to his 
executor his testamentary power to dispose of his property.38 
Trusts for indefinite classes are also thought to be void for want 
of certainty, because it is impossible to determine to whom the 
executor is to distribute the trust property.39 Finally, the rule 
against perpetuities has been given as a reason for the trust rule.40 
II. Inadequacy of Existing Law 
A. Analysis of Testamentary Intent. As has been indicated, 
the courts have analyzed the testator's intent in terms of whether 
he intended to create a trust, or a power, or alternatively, to 
make an outright gift.41 Actually, the present discussion does 
not logically encompass cases which adopt the gift construction. 
Where there has been any meaningful limitation placed upon 
the transfer to the executor, there would appear to be little 
justification for reaching the gift interpretation. More important, 
having found a gift, the court thereby ignores all of the devise 
except "to my executor" which construction, of course, com-
pletely undercuts the problem at hand which centers on the 
effect of the rest of the devise ( e.g., "to distribute to my friends") 
and on the inconsistencies between trust law and power law 
with respect to the necessity of naming definite objects. Thus 
while this comment deals with the validity and effect to be given 
to devises which provide for the executor's selection of the ulti-
mate takers, the gift cases, by treating this distributive language 
as surplusage, fall outside of the problem. Consequently, except 
to note the presence of gift cases in this area and to question 
the validity of such a construction, except where there are special 
considerations, this comment will center its attention on power 
and trust law. 
37 Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805); Scott, 
"Trusts for Charitable and Benevolent Purposes," 58 HARV. L. REv. 548 at 563-565 (1945); 
2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §123 (1956); Gray, "Gifts for a Non-Charitable Purpose," 15 
HARV. L. REV. 509 (1902). 
38 Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson, [1944] A.G. 341. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., 
§123 (1956); Scott, "Trusts for Charitable and Benevolent Purposes," 58 HARV. L. REv. 
548 at 566 (1945). 
39 Scott, "Trusts for Charitable and Benevolent Purposes,'' 58 HARv. L. REV. 548 at 
565 (1945). 
40 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §123 (1956). See Smith, "Honorary Trusts and the Rule 
against Perpetuities," 30 COL. L. REV. 60 (1930); SIJIIES, FUTURE INTERESTS HANDBOOK §113 
(1951). 
41 See SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS HANDBOOK §52, note 24 (1951). 
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It becomes pertinent, then, to undertake a more penetrating 
analysis of testator's intent in terms of his choice between trust 
and power results. It is perhaps accurate to say, however, that 
the testator does not think of either the trust or the power of 
appointment as such in their legal sense. His intentions un-
doubtedly proceed on the more pragmatic level of the specific 
result that he wishes to obtain. 
These intentions may be best illustrated by consideration 
of a hypothetical devise drawn from the cases: "residue to my 
executor to be distributed to such persons as my executor shall 
select." Given no contextual facts other than the language of 
the devise, one may find that the testamentary intent here con-
sists of three distinct elements. First, the fact that the transferee 
is an executor, coupled with the normal rule of construction 
that no language is to be considered surplusage if possible,42 
leads to the conclusion that the executor is not to take the 
property beneficially himself.43 Second, the testator desires that 
the ultimate takers of the property be those persons selected 
by the executor. Finally, since the testator's dispositive scheme 
will be carried out only if the executor actually selects the 
distributees, it appears that the testator desires to obligate the 
executor to make a selection. 
B. Defects in the Traditional Doctrines. If these three ob-
jectives are what a testator would normally intend to reach 
through the hypothetical devise, to what extent are the power 
and trust doctrines of use to him? 
The trust can certainly achieve the first of the testator's aims, 
for the executor may not take beneficially as a trustee. Some 
authorities indicate that upon a showing that the executor 
cannot take for his own use, a devise must therefore be con-
strued as invoking a trust framework.44 Such a conclusion is 
42Thomas v. Anderson, (8th Cir. 1917) 245 F. 642. 
43 See note 3 supra. 
44 Minot v. Attorney General, 189 Mass. 176, 75 N.E. 149 (1905); Tunis v. Dole, 97 
N.H. 420, 89 A. (2d) 760 (1952). The Property Restatement would make this the sole 
test of whether a power or a trust is created. 3 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §323, comment e 
(1940). The standard test for determining whether a power is discretionary or in trust 
is as follows: is the donee of the power under a duty to exercise it? Clark v. Campbell, 
82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926); 1 TRUSTS REsrATEMENT §27 (1935). However, the Property 
Restatement does not recognize the mandatory-discretionary distinction with respect to 
powers. 3 PROPERTY REsrATE!lfENT §320, Special Note (1940). It would recognize the 
necessity of definiteness ·of objects only where the property has been transferred in trust 
to a trustee who is to select the ultimate takers. The test proposed by the Property 
Restatement to determine whether an executor takes in trust is this: is the executor 
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not sound, since it is equally possible to create a valid power 
whereby the executor is excluded as a potential appointee.45 
It appears, therefore, that both a power and trust construction 
can achieve the first element of testator's intent. 
A discretionary power of appointment can clearly carry out 
the second element as well, permitting the executor to select the 
ultimate takers.46 There is no doubt that a trust can produce 
the same result, provided that there is a valid trust. In satisfaction 
of this latter condition, however, the hypothetical devise will 
apparently run afoul of the definite beneficiary rule, since no 
definite class of beneficiaries is specified.47 
Power law cannot achieve the third objective. In order to 
validate a power which takes as its object an indefinite class, 
the testator must make the power discretionary, which of course 
fails to impose an obligation upon the executor to make a 
selection.48 If the power is coupled with a duty to exercise it, 
a power in trust is created, and the power in trust is subject 
to the definite beneficiary requirement; so the hypothetical 
devise must again come within the Morice rule.49 On the other 
hand, although trust law is capable of obligating the executor 
to make a selection, it fails to impose the obligation in the 
hypothetical case, because as a trust, the bequest again must 
be struck down for want of a definite beneficiary. With respect 
to the third objective, then, the laws of trust and power present 
precluded from taking beneficially? 3 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §323, comment e (1940). 
The Property Restatement does not recognize the use of the term power in trust, and it 
is difficult to determine what the Property Restatement does with the case represented 
by the usual meaning of this concept, i.e., donee of the power is under a duty to exercise 
the power. The Property Restatement gives relief for non-exercise only where the objects 
of the power are such as could also be objects of a trust. 3 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §367 
(1940). Thus, since the Property Restatement places no limit on definiteness of objects 
(except that there must be some persons who can be recognizable as coming within the 
class), it would seem that where there is a power in trust to an indefinite class, the 
Property Restatement would allow the donee to exercise the power, although it would 
provide no remedy for non-exercise. This would seem to be Ames' reasoning as will be 
discussed infra. 
45 In re Park, [1932] 1 Ch. 580; Dormer Estate, 348 Pa. 356, 35 A. (2d) 299 (1944); 
In re Jones, [1945] Ch. 105; In re Harvey, [1950] 1 All E.R. 491. See SIMES, FUTURE 
INTERESTS HANDBOOK §52 (1951), and 3 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §323, comment e (1940), 
which states that such,a construction is "conceivable." 
46 Watts's Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51 A. 588 (1902); In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 
241 P. (2d) 781 (1952); In re Coates, [1955] Ch. 495. 
47 1 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §120 (1935). See Hazard v. Bacon, 42 R.I. 415, 108 A. 499 
(1920); Markham v. Tibbetts, (S.D. N.Y. 1947) 79 F. Supp. 47. 
48 Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926); In re Rowland's Estate, 73 
Ariz. 337, 241 P. (2d) 781 (1952). 
49 Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926). 
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an anomaly when the object is an indefinite class. To carry 
out the testator's wishes fully, the executor must be obligated 
to exercise the power of selection, yet as a trust or a power in 
trust (which are the only vehicles for imposing the obligation), 
the devise is totally void for want of a definite beneficiary. The 
devise is thus valid only as a power, the law applicable to which 
does not compel the executor to exercise his discretion. Thus, the 
designation of an indefinite class as the group from which the 
executor is to select, as in the hypothetical devise, automatically 
means that under the existing law, the testator's third objective 
of imposing a duty on the executor will be frustrated. Complete 
fulfillment of the testator's dispositive scheme is simply not 
possible under our present legal structure. 
It is suggested that the traditional analysis is too legalistic 
and mechanical.50 In its initial step of construction, there is great 
unpredictability as to whether it will construe a devise as a 
power or a trust. Then in the second step of applying legal 
doctrine, total invalidity may easily result under the trust con-
struction. It is submitted that in the indefinite-class cases, the 
courts should start with the rudiments of the testator's intent, 
i.e., the results which he wishes to reach by his devise. This 
intent should be measured against the available means of prop-
erty distribution, and since no public policy questions are raised, 
the court's purpose should be to carry out the testator's objectives 
so far as is possible without distorting the devise.51 On such 
an analysis, it would appear that the application of power law 
would be the most satisfactory means of handling of the 
indefinite-class cases, for the devise would be substantially car-
ried out (completely carried out, if executor exercised the power). 
Application of power law would involve no distortion of the 
bequest. If trust law were strictly applied, the property would 
go to testator's heirs or next of kin.r;2 If power law were applied, 
the property would go precisely as testator intended if the power 
were exercised. If the power were not exercised, the trust prop-
erty would remain in the heirs or next of kin, just as it would 
50 See Scott, "Trusts for Charitable and Benevolent Purposes," 58 HARV. L. REv. 548, 
563 (1945). 
51 Dulles's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 67 A. 49 (1907), which sustained a trust for indefinite 
purposes, started with the premise that the owner of property could make any distribution 
of property which is not unlawful. 
52 Estate of Ralston, 1 Cal. (2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934); Morice v. The Bishop of 
Durham, 10 Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805); Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am. 
Rep. 445 (1881). See note 15 supra. 
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under trust law.53 By excluding the executor as a possible ap-
pointee, 54 any possibility that the property would be distributed 
in conflict with testator's wishes would be eliminated. 
III. Correlation of Trust and Power Law 
A. The Ames Approach. The inconsistent results reached 
in these indefinite-class cases by application of trust or power 
law were early brought into focus by Dean Ames,55 who argued 
for a partial change in the trust rule in order to make it con-
sistent with power doctrine. 
Ames apparently recognized that there were two aspects to 
the definite beneficiary rule in the Morice decision: (1) unless 
a testator names a definite beneficiary or beneficiaries who can 
enforce the trust on their own behalf, an enforceable trust can-
not be created; and (2) on failure of the bequest to create an 
enforceable trust, the bequest is void and of no effect and the 
executor must hold the property on a resulting trust in favor 
of the heirs or next of kin. Although he apparently conceded 
the validity of the first proposition, Ames disagreed with the 
second, arguing that voiding the trust was a result which did 
not necessarily follow from acceptance of the rule requiring 
an enforceable obligation.56 He felt that the unenforceable trust 
might nevertheless be given limited legal effect. He reasoned as 
follows: 
It is agreed that when the executor is vested with a discre-
tionary power to select appointees from an indefinite class, the 
executor is permitted to make the selection so long as he appoints 
to one who fits the description of the class designated.57 Yet if 
under the same circumstances the executor is vested with a 
mandatory power of selection, the devise is void. Since the dis-
cretionary power is valid though unenforceable, it is entirely 
inconsistent to hold that a mandatory power is void, because 
it is unenforceable.58 When testator attempts to impose a duty 
to make a selection in the trust context, the executor should be 
permitted to carry out the terms of the trust, even though no 
enforceable obligation is created. The executor should have a 
53 See note 65 infra. 
54 See note 45 supra. 
55 Ames, "The Failure of the Tilden Trust," 5 HARv. L. REv. 389 (1892). 
56 Id. at 395 
57 See notes 26, 27, 28, and 29 supra. 
58 Ames' reasoning indicates that he believed that the real basis for the definite 
beneficiary rule was the necessity of having someone to enforce the trust. See note 37 supra. 
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discretionary power to carry out the trust in favor of persons 
who clearly came within the limits of the named but indefinite 
class of beneficiaries.59 
The Ames position does not wholly undercut the Morice 
rule, because it continues to recognize that no enforceable rights 
can be vested in members of the indefinite class. It does, on the 
other hand, depart from the traditional conception that specifica-
tion of an indefinite class creates by operation of law a resulting 
trust in favor of the heirs or next of kin. 
B. Criticism of the Ames Approach. Gray and Bogert have 
defended the prevailing Morice rule.60 Gray's argument with 
Ames rests on the conception that there cannot be an enforceable 
trust without a definite beneficiary to whom the trustee owes 
a duty. Without a beneficiary to hold a correlative right, a trust 
duty cannot be imposed on the trustee.61 He further argued 
that a valid trust could not be created without a proper benefi-
ciary in whom could be vested the equitable title to the trust 
corpus. Absent such a beneficiary, legal title would be in the 
trustee with equitable title in limbo.62 
59 Ames developed his argument with reference to the Tilden Trust [see Tilden v. 
Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880 (1891)], which was a trust for indefinite purposes. However, 
Ames would -not have limited his view to the trust for indefinite purposes, since his 
rationale was based on the inconsistency of the trust rule with the rule relating to the 
discretionary power of appointment. Scott has recognized the applicability of the Ames 
view to the indefinite class trust. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §122 (1956). Since trusts both 
for indefinite purposes and for indefinite classes of persons fail for want of a definite 
beneficiary, and since in both types of cases it would be equally possible for the trustee 
to carry out the trust through a power, it is believed that there is no valid basis for 
according different treatment to the two types of cases, with respect to the application 
of the Ames rationale. 
60 In -his first edition, although he apparently personally advocates the Ames rationale, 
Scott stated that the power rule was not consistent with the trust rule. l Scorr, TRUSTS, 
1st ed., §122 (1939). In allowing a donee to distribute among appointees of an indefinite 
class, the discretionary power rule was in conflict with Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 
133 A. 166 (1926). The trust and power rules could, of course, be harmonized by changing 
the power rule so that it conformed to the trust rule. Norris v. Thomson's Executors, 19 
N.J. Eq. 307 (1868), seems to be the only authority for applying the definite-objects rule 
to all powers. Such an approach would seriously undercut a most useful means of property 
distribution; all but special powers would be invalidated. Since the sole achievement of 
this approach would be to attain symmetry, there would appear to be no sound basis 
for adopting this view. In his recent second edition, Scott does not state that the power 
rule is out of line with the trust rule, and he seems to indicate that it is the trust rule, 
rather than the power rule, that is defective. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§122, 123 (1956). 
See also Scott, "Conveyances upon Trusts Not Properly Declared," 37 HARV. L. REv. 653 
at 687, 688 (1924); Scott, "Control of Property by the Dead," 65 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 527 
at 538 (1917). 
61 Gray, "Gifts For a Non-Charitable Purpose," 15 HARv. L. REv. 509 at 512-514 
(1902). GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., Appendix H. (1915). But see GRAY, 
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §909 (1942). 
62 Gray, "Gifts For a Non-Charitable Purpose," 15 HARv. L. REv. 509 at 514 (1902). 
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Gray's cntlcISm fails to recognize that there are potentially 
two means by which the definite beneficiary might be changed 
in order to make it consistent with power law. The first would be 
to abolish the Morice rule completely and permit the creation of 
a trust for which there is no beneficiary. The second would be to 
modify the rule so that instead of totally invalidating a trust 
for which the beneficiary is indefinite courts would give effect 
to the devise only so far as is possible under the guides furnished 
by the testator. Gray appeared to believe that Ames subscribed 
to the first alternative, and if this were so, there would be merit 
in his criticism. But it would appear that Ames followed the 
second course, permitting the trustee to carry out the otherwise 
unenforceable trust. Since Ames' analysis is explained in terms 
of a power-liability relationship, Gray's right-duty criticism would 
seem inappropriate.63 
Gray's second argument, based upon the absence of a person 
or persons in whom to vest equitable title, is also met under 
the Ames view. Equitable title is vested in the heirs or next of 
kin, subject to divestment by the exercise of the executor's power 
of selection, and legal title is in the executor. All estate interests 
are therefore properly vested. 64 
Analyzing the executor's action in terms of power rather than 
duty does not completely eliminate checks upon his discretion. 
The power to carry out the trust would presumably exist for 
only a reasonble time before it would be extinguished, and if 
the executor attempted to use his power in a means not con-
templated by the terms of the bequest, his act could be held not 
to have divested the heirs or next of kin of equitable title.65 
Such checks would appear to be no less effective than those 
available under trust law. 
Bogert's criticism is based upon a fear that the trust institu-
63 Gray's answer to this proposition would be that the testator intended to create 
either a mandatory or a discretionary power; if the former were intended, the devise 
must stand or fall as such. Id. at 513. 
64 Scott has suggested that the heirs or next of kin take on a resulting trust which 
is subject to a condition precedent that the executor fails to exercise his power to carry 
out the trust. Scott, "Control of Property by the Dead," 65 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 527 at 538 
(1917); Scott, "Conveyances Upon Trusts Not Properly Declared," 37 HARv. L. REv. 653 
at 687, 688 (1924). If the equitable title of the heirs or next of kin were subject to a condi-
tion precedent, then the equitable title would still be outstanding and vested in no one. 
Gray's criticism would thus be valid. In his recent second edition, however, Scott states 
that the equitable title vests immediately in the heirs or next of kin from whom it can be 
divested by exercise of the power. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §123 (1956). 
651 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §124, comment" b (1935); TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, SECOND, 
Tentative Draft No. 3, §122, comment d, §123, comment d (1956). 
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tion will be further diluted by acceptance of the Ames approach. 
He feels that in order to derive the traditional benefits available 
from use of a trust, one should be required to comply precisely 
with its requirements. Any chipping away at these requirements 
will lead to uncertainty and confusion. 66 It seems obvious, how-
ever, that the Ames view would not compel a departure from the 
accepted requirements for creation of an enforceable trust, but 
would only place a power in the trustee not heretofore recog-
nized. It may be further suggested that instead of lending un-
certainty to the law, the Ames rationale would render the law 
more certain. The present law would appear to provide very 
little basis for predicting whether a devise created a valid power 
or an invalid trust. 
To the criticisms of these authors may be added the suggested 
justifications for creation and preservation of the definite benefi-
ciary trust rule outlined in section I-C above. The first justifica-
tion there indicated amounts to no more than Gray's criticism 
of the Ames view, based upon a Hohfeldian type of analysis, 
just discussed, and appears to require no further comment. The 
second argument advanced in favor of the Morice rule, that 
enforcement of a trust in favor of an indefinite class of benefi-
ciaries would amount to ·usurpation of testamentary powers, is 
not a sound basis for attacking the Ames view. The courts have 
shown constant willingness to accept the validity of the discre-
tionary power of appointment, which potentially is equally 
capable of usurping testamentary powers. This willingness would 
appear to indicate that any public policy opposing invasion of 
the testator's domain is insubstantial at best when applied to 
these cases in the manner that Ames advocates. 67 
Uncertainty as to taker was the basis for the third argument 
in favor of the definite beneficiary rule. It may be submitted 
that while this contention would have validity as to a trust in 
favor of a wholly indefinite class, 68 it is inapplicable as a ground 
for attacking the Ames view. Ames' doctrine is intended to apply 
only to the case where the class is partially definite; in such event, 
the executor is permitted to appoint solely persons whom the 
court determines to fall definitely within the class. 69 
66 lA BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§162, 166 (1951). 
67 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §123 (1956). 
68 See notes 33 and 34 supra. 
69 In re Gestetner Settlement, [1953] Ch. 672; Dulles's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 67 A. 49 
(1907). 
1182 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 56 
To the final argument that the rule against perpetmtles is 
a bar to a trust in favor of an indefinite class, one may reply that 
the executor's power would need to be exercised within a reason-
able time or at least within his lifetime. Under this interpreta-
tion, the power could not be exercised beyond the period of 
the rule. On closer analysis it will be noted that the rule against 
perpetuities is not actually a reason for the definite beneficiary 
rule. Whereas the trust rule is concerned with what is the proper 
beneficiary of a trust, 70 the rule against perpetuities deals, in the 
present setting, with the wholly independent question of when the 
trustee can exercise his power of selection. The latter inquiry 
is pertinent in determining validity, irrespective of whether 
the class of objects is definite or indefinite. 
C. Acceptance by the Trusts Restatements. As originally pub-
lished, the Restatement of Trusts largely followed the great 
weight of authority with respect to the rules pertaining to trust 
beneficiaries.71 The honorary trust doctrine, however, was broad-
ly extended to allow the trustee of any unenforceable trust to 
carry out its terms, if specific, non-capricious purposes were 
named as the object of the trust.72 Where the trust was created 
for a partially indefinite class,. no such discretion was given the 
trustee as Ames would suggest, 73 except where the trustee was 
to select the beneficiaries from among the testator's relatives74 
in which case the trustee could make the selection, even though 
there was no enforceable trust.75 
In a recently approved revision to the Restatement of Trusts, 
70 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §123 (1956). See note 65 supra. 
71 1 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §§112, 122, 123, 124, 125 (1935). 
72 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §124 (1935). The decided cases have not applied the 
honorary trust rule to all trusts for specific purposes, but the rule has been limited chiefly 
to trusts for animals, for care of graves, erection of monuments and a few other similar 
specific purposes. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§124 to 124.7 (1956). In Estate of Reed, 82 
Cal. App. (2d) 448, 186 P. (2d) 147 (1947), although the devise in trust was for the specific 
purpose of carrying on the work of two named persons, the bequest was held totally 
void, the court applying the general trust rule. But see In re Thompson, [1934] Ch. 342, 
where the honorary trust doctrine was applied to a trust for the specific purpose of 
promoting foxhunting. The A.L.l. apparently recognized that §124 involved an extension 
of the honorary trust doctrine, for in comment d, §124, it notes that the rule has been 
applied in the types of cases enumerated above. 
73 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §122 (1935). 
74 "Relatives" constitutes an indefinite class when it is interpreted to mean everyone 
who is related to the testator. If "relatives" is used to mean only the testator's next of 
kin, then it constitutes a definite class. 
75 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §121 (1935). See 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §121 (1956). See 
Huling v. Fenner, 9 R.l. 410 (1870). 
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there have been two changes accepted which would allow the 
trustee of an unenforceable trust, either for an indefinite class 
or for general or indefinite purposes, to carry out the trust, if 
the trustee were directed or authorized by the terms of the trust 
to select the ultimate takers from the class or the purpose, and 
if the class or purpose were not entirely indefinite.76 Together 
with the existing broadly stated honorary trust rule, these two 
changes appear to represent a complete adoption of the Ames 
rationale in the Restatement. 
D. Acceptance by the Courts. In contrast to this change in 
the Restatement viewpoint, there has appeared very little judi-
cial precedent giving support for Ames' suggested revision of 
the definite beneficiary rule. The vast majority of jurisdictions 
do not accept his position, and, indeed, do not even bother to 
discuss it. 
Perhaps the greatest amount of support is to be encountered 
in the honorary trust cases, where a specific purpose is designated, 
but no definite beneficiary is named. Despite the fact that there 
is no definite beneficiary to whom the trustee's duty is owing 
and by whom the trust can be enforced, these trusts are generally 
accepted as valid to the limited extent of giving the trustee a 
power to carry out the trust. Trusts of which the purpose was 
to benefit animals,77 erect monuments,78 care for graves,79 and a 
few other similar specific purposes have been upheld.80 
There are at least three American decisions which did not 
decree total invalidity where a definite beneficiary was not des-
ignated. 81 These courts allowed the executor to select the trust 
beneficiaries, where the devise named general purposes which 
were sufficiently definite so that a court could determine whether 
a given selectee came within the named purposes. One English 
decision, in permitting a trustee to carry out a trust for a partially 
76 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, SECOND, Tentative Draft No. 3, §§122, 123 (1956). For the 
A.L.I.'s discussion of proposed §§122 and 123, see 33rd Annual Meeting, A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 
445-454 (1956). The second edition, embodying these changes, was adopted in 1957. See 
34th Annual Meeting, A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 279 (1957). 
77 In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1889); In re Estate of Searight, 87 Ohio App. 417, 95 
N .E. (2d) 779 (1950). 
78 Estate of Koppikus, 1 Cal. App. 84, 81 P. 732 (1905). 
79 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §124.2 (1956). 
so 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§124 to 124.7 (1956). See In re Thompson, [1934] Ch. 342. 
See note 25 supra. 
81 Dulles's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 67 A. 49 (1907); Cochran v. McLaughlin, 128 Conn. 
638, 24 A. (2d) 836 (1942); Feinberg v. Feinberg, (Del. Ch. 1957) 131 A. (2d) 658. 
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definite class, appears to have enunciated precisely the Ames 
viewpoint.82 Other cases which hold that a power is created where 
th~ executor is directed to distribute, lend indirect support to the 
Ames position, 83 and the ruling that a valid power can be created 
which excludes only the executor as a possible appointee also 
provides some support, by undercutting the position that a 
· trust must be intended if the executor cannot take beneficially.84 
IV. Conclusion 
Prevailing trust and power law, when applied side by side 
in the perspective of bequests to executors for distribution, 
produce inconsistent results. The courts, however, have shown 
little inclination to correlate the two or to alter their traditional 
"pigeon-holing" method of analysis by which these principles 
are applied. It is submitted that the concepts of power and trust 
should be employed, not as ends in themselves, but as means for 
effectuating the desires of the testator. Acceptance of the Ames 
rationale would provide a sound step in this direction and would 
solve at least part of the present conflict between trust and power 
doctrines. It seems but common sense to give the executor a 
power by the use of which he can fully effectuate a bequest, 
rather than imposing total invalidity of the trust as a sanction 
for testator's failure to specify all the potential beneficiaries to 
whom the executor may distribute. 
William P. Wooden, S.Ed. 
82 In re Gestetner Settlement, [1953] Ch. 672. 
83 See notes 26, 27, 28 and 29 supra. The final result of In re Rowland's Estate, 73 
Ariz. 337,241 P. (2d) 781 (1952), was a holding that there was a power in trust where the 
object was definite and a discretionary power where the class of objects was indefinite. 
Some courts reason that, since no definite beneficiaries are named, the testator intended 
to create a power. In re Lidston's Estate, 32 Wash. (2d) 408, 202 P. (2d) 259 (1949); 
Hodgson v. Dorsey, 230 Iowa 730, 298 N.W. 895 (1941); Gilman v. Gilman, 99 Conn. 
598, 122 A. 386 (1923); and Harvey, Exr. v. Griggs, 12 Del. Ch. 232, 111 A. 437 (1920). 
It should be noted that, although the cases cited in this note reach the ultimate Ames 
result, they do so within the existing framework of the law by holding, as a matter of 
construction, that a power was intended by the devise. This reasoning is to be distin-
guished from the Ames view which would hold that, even though a devise be construed 
as an intended trust, the executor or trustee would ,be given a power to carry out the 
unenforceable trust. To what extent, if any, the Ames rationale has influenced courts 
in finding a power as a matter of construction is not discernible from the decisions. 
84 In re Park, [1932] 1 Ch. 580. See note 45 supra. Dormer Estate, 348 Pa. 
356, 35 A. (2d) 299 (1944), is apparently the only American decision in point. The two 
executors were found to have a power which was general, except that they could not 
appoint to themselves. Unfortunately, the direct holding of the case, that on the death 
of one executor the power was destroyed, does not directly support this proposition. 
